Welcome to America

Loving this photo from today's Times.

Here are our official-looking, big-strong defenders of justice escorting to justice that international criminal brigand . . . while showing off a little sports team pride! There we have a Raiders hat, back there is an Ohio State Buckeyes cap, and directly northwest of the Russian's 'stache is a, ?, Buffalo Sabres anyone? We Americans, we do love our sports culture. You'd think the poor guy had committed crimes against the AFC West.

Thoughts on the Election

1. Obama didn't go about trying to save his party in this past election to insure he wins the next one.

Mid-term elections are about domestic issues; presidential elections are about foreign issues. Only on the former is there tangible dissatisfaction - on the latter, the Prez is doing just fine. I think his goal was to distance himself from what would be a very foreseeable loss and, in two years time, with Americans out of Iraq and Republicans blame-able in the House, finally turn to the American public and say, hey, I have accomplished a ton.

2. Prop 19. How many more Mexican gang murders before Californian moralists realize their prudishness is killing more people than its helping? Just at thought.

3. I disagree with his policies, but Obama's the man. Am I the only who thinks his words and actions betray a man of tangible decency, old-school virtue, humble intelligence, and radical self-awareness. I think many of his solutions are wrong, but as a dude . . . he's the man. Isn't this obvious? Am I crazy?

Four Points on Vayera

1. Definitely some room for comparing the Sodomites at Lot's door with the story of Migdal Bavel. All the city's men - a unified group - gather to do something bad. Though, by merit of their numbers and unity, they would be able to succeed, a Divine force intervenes by removing a basic human skill.

Also, once again, cities/organized human communities get a bad rap in the Bible.

Essential to this is the mob's line to Lot, הָאֶחָד בָּא-לָגוּר וַיִּשְׁפֹּט שָׁפוֹט "this one comes to sojourn here a while, and he thinks he can play the judge" . . . . something is going on here, as in Babel, that regards questions of authority and community.


2. Every time I read the parsha anew, I'm surprised by the צחק wordplay. Yeah - I expect it in the Sarah and Avraham stories, and its always interesting that they name their son with it . . . but then I'm totally *shocked* to see it appear again in the Sodom episode. Lot tries to warn his sons-in-law about the approaching destruction, but he is in their eyes כִמְצַחֵק, as a jester.

What's the deal!!!

3. Check out my dvar torah on Akeidat Yishmael, at The Drisha Parsha Blog

4. Finally, finally, finally!: I think I know why God scolded Sarah for laughing: He didn't - God scolded Avraham.

In 17:15-17 God tells Avraham that he'll have a child in his old age. Avraham, as we know, laughs in amazement. And, as we know, no immediate negative reaction from God to this laughter. Laughing is a legit reaction to hearing something fantastical for the first time.

Now, let's say you're Avraham and you bear the righteous faith that what God said is actually going to happen. What sort of things do you do? Well, you probably tell Sarah that she's destined have more kids. You probably tell her that you'd like to try to conceive a child together. You would certainly sleep with Sarah or perhaps sleep with her more often than you previously did. But either way, Sarah would understand that a child is a distinct possibility!

So when a few months later, a few fellows come in and say that Sarah will soon be with child, the fact that Sarah laughs is damning - it means this is the first time she heard of the promise! Avraham hasn't been doing any of the aforementioned things! Hasn't told her himself, or slept with her, or said, "hey, let's try to have a child."

It should not surprise us if God would ask Avraham something like - "What the heck, Avraham?! Why is she laughing?! How could you not believe in my promise to you?!". In fact, this is exactly what God does in 18:13-14

וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה, אֶל-אַבְרָהָם: לָמָּה זֶּה צָחֲקָה שָׂרָה לֵאמֹר, הַאַף אֻמְנָם אֵלֵד--וַאֲנִי זָקַנְתִּי . . . הֲיִפָּלֵא מֵיְהוָה, דָּבָר.

And God said to Avraham, "Why is Sarah laughing? Why is she saying 'Oh, is it really possible I'll give birth so old!!'" You really think anything is too hard for Me to do?!

Note, the "rebuke" is handed out to Avraham - not to Sarah - for it is Sarah's laughter which shows Avraham has not trusted in God's promise.

Economic Mass E-mail

You may or may not have received the following mass e-mail, just in time for the upcoming elections. It *sounds* like an interesting critique, but something is just straight wrong about it. Can you solve its hidden riddle?:

HOW A STIMULUS PACKAGE WORKS.

It is a hot day in the small Kansas town of Pumphandle and streets are deserted. Times are tough, everybody is in debt, and living on credit.

A salesman drives into town, stops at the only motel, and lays a $100 bill on the desk to pay for a one night's stay... on the condition that the room is decent. He's handed a key so he can check it out.

As soon as the salesman heads upstairs, the motel owner grabs the hundred bucks and runs next door to pay his debt to the butcher.

The butcher takes the $100 and hustles down the street to pay off what he owes to the pig farmer.

The pig farmer takes the $100 and heads off to settle his bill with the Co-op.

The guy at the Co-op takes the $100 and runs to pay what he owes to the local hooker, who's had to offer her "services" on credit.

The hooker dashes to the motel and pays off her room rentals.

The motel owner puts the $100 back on the counter.

The salesman comes back down and states that the room is unsatisfactory. He takes his $100 bill and leaves.

No one produced anything. No one earned anything... However, the whole town is now out of debt and looks to the future with unbridled optimism.

And that, dear friends, is how a "stimulus package" works.

Here's why this critique ain't a good one:

Let's say there are just two people in a town - say, a motel owner and a hooker. Let's suppose that at one point the motel owner borrowed 100 bucks from the hooker, and that at another point the hooker borrowed 100 bucks from the motel owner. Does either party owe either party? Of course not! They're even!

The example in the email was the exact same, but instead of 2 parties, there were 5. A owes B, B owes C, C owes D, D owes E, and E owes A. In other words, nobody owes anybody. Before the salesman came nobody owed anybody, while the salesman was in town nobody owed anybody, and after he left nobody owed anybody.

---------

Anyhoo, it seems to me that Sciences are granted by the public a sort of Obedience to Mystery. I, Ben the Non-Mathematician, may not understand the upper levels of crazy Mathland, but I'm willing to submit to it, willing to understand that there *are* mathematicians who have been trained in the technical language of their art and do indeed make substantive progress. There's a conception of initiates and non-initiates, and a tangible (if not fragile) trust by the non-initiates towards those who work in the field.

Economics, it seems, has failed to garner such respect. The main cause, I believe, is because economics deals with something everyone has and considers themselves expert of - money. We use it and we know it and we treat ourselves as semi-initiates, expecting common sense to guide us to truth and treating technical economic language with mistrust and disgust.

In the public eye, the most celebrated economist in the world will never be able to stand up to the Warren Buffet and Bill Gates - "hey, they are the ones who are actually making the economy work." No biologist ever felt threatened by a particularly prolific rabbit - "hey man, you study life, but this rabbit here has reproduced life like a 1000 times"; nor do authors feel threatened by men who lead dramatic lives - "hey man, you write interesting stories, but I met a guy who once had a really interesting life"; but economists, due to nature of our interests (money, utility, labor, etc.) are always assumed to be speaking overly fancy things about that which everyone and anyone already "knows".

Cohen as Korban?

A very, very rough outline of Parshat Emor's first two perekim:

Perek 21
A. The Impurity Caused by a Dead Cohen (21:1-6, 1o-12)
B. A Cohenness who Must be Burned (21:9)
C. The Disqualification of a Blemished Cohen (21:16-24)

Perek 22
A. The Impurity Caused by a Dead Animal/Carrion (22:8)
B. Laws of a Sacrifice That Must be Burned (22:17-18)
C. The Disqualification of a Blemished Sacrifice (22:19-24)

Wacky, right?

The textual parallel is very loose and shaky. But the conceptual parallel is kinda cool.

Newcomb's Paradox Part 2

And here's the paradox, in the words of the philosopher Robert Nozick: "To almost everyone, it is perfectly clear and obvious what should be done. The difficulty is that these people seem to divide almost evenly on the problem, with large numbers thinking that the opposing half is just being silly." (Oh right, here's Part 1)

One half thinks as follows:

There's a 99.9% chance that Olivia made an accurate prediction. If I reach for both Box A and Box B, there is a 99.9% chance that there is nothing in Box B, and I'll end up with a measly $1000. Sure, there is a .1% she's wrong and I'll get 1,001,000 dollars - but those are terrible odds! If, instead, I only reach for Box B, there is a 99.9% chance that Olivia left a million bucks in it, which I'll end up with. There's a .1% chance she's wrong and I'll end up with nothing, but those are very low odds!

If you want to get all mathematical about it, the expected value of choosing Box A and B is:

(.999)(1000) + (.001)(1001000) = 999 + 100 = 1999

while the expected value of choosing just Box B is:

(.999)(1000000) + (.001)(0) = 999000.

Choosing just Box B wins! In game theory, we call this approach the expected utility hypothesis.


However, the other half of humanity, thinks differently:
Regardless of how Olivia acts, it is always better for me to choose both boxes. There are four possible outcomes, summarized in the following chart.

	Box B contains nothing	Box B contains $1,000,000
Choose Box B	$0	$1000000
Choose Box B and A	$1000	$1,000,1000

Notice that "Choose Box B and A" always produces a higher payout! If Box B contains nothing, then choosing both boxes gets you 1000 dollars instead of nothing; if Box B contains something, choosing both boxes again nets you an additional 1000 dollars. In game theory lingo, the "Choose Box B and A" strategy strictly dominates the "Choose Box B" strategy. Choosing both boxes wins!

In technical terms, we have a conflict between the Dominance Principle and the Expected Utility Hypothesis. In layman's terms, an ability to predict the future (even a non-perfect ability!) seriously screws with the way we think.

We're relatively comfortable with the idea that decisions today can affect events in the future; when future-seeing is allowed into the mix, we have to start pondering whether decisions today can affect events in the pass. We have to wonder: can my decision right now about which box to choose affect what Olivia - in the past - decided to put into Box B?

Newcomb's Paradox

Here's a fine way to melt your neural connections. Consider the following:

There are two boxes, A and B. Box A contains $1000, whereas Box B contains either $1,000,000 or absolutely nothing. You may choose to take Box A, Box B, or both, and keep any money inside. At first, your decision is simple: take both. Can't hurt.

But here's the catch:

A wise creature (Olivia the Owl) has been known to predict the future with 99.9% accuracy. You have performed many trials to establish this fact: you have had Olivia predict what you will eat for breakfast tomorrow, whether your child will be male or female, whether the stock market will rise or depreciate, whether or not you'll get that promotion, and even what color underwear you will wear in precisely a year from now - and we have established that Olivia the Owl has excellent predictive power. (For the sake of argument, its possible for Olivia to be wrong in her predictions. Out of the one thousand trials that you conducted, she failed once.)

One hour before you make your decision, Olivia the Owl gets to decide whether Box B will contain one million dollars or, instead, the proverbial sack of coal. She tells you: "If I predict that in the future you will pick only Box B, then, right now, one hour before you make your decision, I will place the full $1,000,000 into Box B. If, however, I predict that in the future you will take both Box A and Box B, then, right now, one hour before you actually make your decision, I will leave absolutely nothing in Box B."

So: what should you do?